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Abstract
We examine how reputation concerns induce a multinational to partly withhold its entry into a
developing country under weak intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. Equilibrium IPR vio-
lations are shown to arise only in the presence of such concerns. Holding constant a multinationals
incentive to innovate, better IPR enforcement encourages entry, but reduces social welfare. The multi-
nationals incentive to innovate may be inversely U-shaped in the strength of IPR enforcement. If
timed properly, however, stronger IPR enforcement can foster innovation without compromising social
welfare. Testable implications concerning observable IPR violations are derived.
Keywords: entry, reputation, intellectual property rights.
JEL Code: D82, F10, F12, F23
1 Introduction
We analyze how the strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement in developing countries
a¤ects multinationalsentry into these countries. Existing studies typically assume weak IPR to be the
only imperfection obstructing such entry. In reality, however, developing countries su¤er from many other
imperfections. We show that taking these imperfections into account generates new insights into our
understanding of IPR enforcement in developing countries.
The particular imperfection that we consider here is information asymmetry between consumers and
multinationals with regard to the latters product quality. Although consumers in developing countries
expect multinationals to o¤er better quality products on average, evidence shows that they are not always
aware of top-notch brand names, let alone the quality of all foreign products. A recent study of the Chinese
luxury market by McKinsey and Company (2011), for example, reports that in 2008 only 23 percent of
the countrys wealthy consumers could name more than three ready-to-wear international brands and that
only 44 percent were aware that the prices of luxury products sold in China were at least 20 percent higher
than those in overseas markets.1
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ryqiu@hku.hk): School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong; Wen Zhou: School of Business, University
of Hong Kong. We are grateful for the helpful comments of Chong-en Bai, Hongbin Cai, Jacques Cremer, Tanjim Houssain,
David Levine, Zhigang Tao, Cheng Wang, Yong Wang, Li-An Zhou and the seminar participants at Katholieke Universiteit
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1Taking advantage of this ignorance, some foreign companies export products made in China and then re-import
and sell them as foreign brands that do not actually exist. In addition, multinationals sometimes fail or are un-
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In the face of such asymmetric information, a multinationals entry choice will a¤ect its reputation.
We rst analyze a multinationals entry under the assumption of symmetric information as a benchmark.
Without any reputation concerns, a multinational will fully enter a developing country, outpricing copycats
no matter how weak IPR enforcement is. Although no imitation takes place in equilibrium, potential
competition from imitators trims the multinationals prots and hence diminishes its ex ante incentive to
innovate. Thus, we obtain the typical insight that strengthening IPR enforcement encourages innovation
and technology transfer.
Under information asymmetry, we show that a high-quality multinational can signal its quality by
limiting the scale of its entry, whereas its low-quality counterpart always engages in full-scale entry. This
signaling mechanism resonates with the celebrated work of Spence (1973), who showed that more capable
individuals would nd it less costly to signal their ability through education than their less capable peers.
A similar logic underlies our result. Weak IPR enforcement forces a multinational to incur a cost to mask
its technology upon entry, and that cost is higher for a high-quality multinational. Because the foregone
prot will be lower, a high-quality multinational nds it less costly to signal by withholding entry than a
low-quality multinational. Such withholding of entry in turn leaves room for imitation, which takes place
in equilibrium if and only if IPR enforcement is su¢ ciently weak. This last observation highlights an
important feature that is largely ignored in the existing literature: IPR violation is observable under weak
enforcement only in the presence of other forms of imperfection. A number of testable implications emerge
from this observation. In particular, we show that the scale of observed IPR violations increases with the
growth rate of the host countrys economy and the quality premium of the products and decreases with
the interest rate.
Our model also allows us to examine the e¤ects of strengthening IPR enforcement. First, a multinational
will enter more aggressively when IPR enforcement is strengthened, which roughly matches empirical
observations (see, for example, Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Smith, 2001; Branstetter et al., 2006; Ivus,
2010; Branstetter et al., 2011).
Second, holding constant the incentive to innovate, strengthened IPR enforcement can reduce social
welfare. We obtain this result by assuming perfectly inelastic demand, such that the ine¢ ciency does not
stem from the multinationals monopoly power. Rather, imitation in unserved markets represents a social
gain, and stronger IPR enforcement reduces that gain without su¢ ciently expanding the multinationals
entry. Under symmetric information, in contrast, better IPR enforcement merely redistributes the social
surplus between consumers and the multinational without changing its total amount.
Third, a multinational may not always benet from better IPR enforcement. Imitation presents a
high-quality multinational with the following tradeo¤s. In the places the multinational enters, competition
from potential imitators trims its prots. In the places that the multinational chooses not to enter,
able to maintain product quality in developing countries as rigorously as they do in their home countries. Mc-
Donalds, Carrefour, and Wal-Mart have all been exposed as selling substandard products in China in recent years
(http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/story/2012-03-16/china-mcdonalds-carrefour-chicken-nes/53565980/1).
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however, imitation brings an e¢ ciency gain that may be shared by the multinational through litigation.
The multinationals payo¤ may then be inversely U-shaped in IPR strength, which leads to a similar
relationship between the innovation incentive and IPR strength. This relationship echoes the empirical
ndings of Scherer (1967) and Aghion et al. (2005).
Fourth, the timing of IPR improvement is important. In an environment characterized by information
asymmetry, the deferred improvement of IPR enforcement can foster multinationals innovation without
compromising social welfare.
Earlier research on IPR protection in developing countries probed the relationship between imitation in
these countries and innovation in developed countries without explicitly considering multinationalsentry
choices. Segerstrom et al. (1990) and Helpman (1993) assumed imitation to be the only means of technology
transfer, and suggested that imitation in developing countries allows their labor force to make use of existing
innovations, thus leaving the labor force in developed countries free to specialize in future innovations.2
This insight promoted a number of researchers to consider other channels of technology transfer. Lai (1998),
and subsequently Branstetter and Saggi (2011), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), and Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2011), argued that if technologies can be transferred through direct investment, then weak
IPR protection allows imitators to compete labor away from foreign investment, thus forcing multinationals
to keep production in developed countries, which in turn competes labor away from innovation.
This line of research shares two assumptions. First, labor in a developing country can engage only in
imitation unless employed by multinationals. Accordingly, increased imitation always takes labor away from
foreign investments rather than from other indigenous economic activities. Second, there is no possibility
of contracting (such as licensing) between multinationals and domestic rms. Yang and Maskus (2001) and
Yang and Maskus (2009) departed from these two assumptions. Both papers adopt a partial equilibrium
framework in which, as the only channel of technology transfer, a multinational can license a copycat, and
the production cost is una¤ected by IPR strength. Reaching the same conclusion that weak IPR protection
hurts multinationals by expanding licensees options to imitate, Yang and Maskus (2001) nevertheless
observed that imitation will not take place in equilibrium when licensing is an option. This observation
was conrmed by Yang and Maskus (2009), who showed that imitation will take place only in the limiting
situation that IPR protection is entirely absent. Finally, Ethier and Markusen (1996) considered both
licensing and direct investment in addition to exporting to a developing country in which IPR protection
is completely absent. They did not examine how IPR protection a¤ects entry mode or innovation, but
nevertheless also found imitation not to occur in equilibrium.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. We adopt a partial equilibrium framework that
2Grossman and Helpman (1991) o¤ered another explanation for why imitation in developing countries may facilitate
innovation in developed countries. If continual innovation in developed countries is motivated only by the competition threat
from imitation in developing countries, then any measure that reduces imitation in those countries will also reduce innovation
in the former (see also Glass and Saggi, 2002; Glass and Wu, 2007). A similar argument lies behind the results reported by
Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion et al. (2005) in a more general setting. Bessen and Maskin (2009) suggested that existing
innovation may complement future innovation, and as a result, weak IPR protection facilitates future innovation by allowing
a cheaper access to existing innovation.
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considers both direct investment and licensing as entry options. The licensing option allows multinationals
to contract with potential imitators. In addition to weak IPR enforcement, information asymmetry is
introduced as an additional imperfection. We develop three key insights. First, when weak IPR enforcement
is the only imperfection, imitators can be priced out of competition whenever licensing is feasible. Imitation
takes place in equilibrium only in the presence of additional imperfections such as information asymmetry.
Second, equilibrium imitation becomes a channel of technology transfer that brings e¢ ciency gains, which
can be shared by multinationals through moderately strong IPR enforcement. Third, although it transfers
technology and benets multinationals, imitation is less e¢ cient than legitimate channels of technology
transfer. It emerges as a supplement only when some other imperfections prevent multinationals from
taking full advantage of legitimate transfers.
We would like to emphasize, however, that we are not arguing the case for whether multinationals
benet from weak IPR enforcement in real life, which is an empirical issue. Nor do we wish to advocate
any particular nation disregarding IPR protection. Nevertheless, as a theoretical possibility, our insight that
imitation can result in e¢ ciency gains and that multinationals can share in that gain through moderately
strong IPR enforcement remains an intriguing one. It also does not seem too far-fetched, as our prediction of
inverted U-shaped relationships between IPR strength and multinational prots is consistent with empirical
studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After setting up the model in Section 2, we establish
in Section 3 the equilibrium under both symmetric and asymmetric information conditions, and show that
imitation takes place in equilibrium only under asymmetric information. Section 4 discusses the e¤ects
of stronger IPR enforcement on entry scale, social welfare, and a multinationals prots and innovation
incentive. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model Set-up
We consider a two-period model in which a multinational (M) from a developed country has to decide
whether and how to bring its product to a developing country. The quality of its product is either high or
low, such that M 2 fMh;M lg. The developing country comprises a continuum of regions, each forming a
separate market which is referred to as a segment. Each segment is inhabited by a unit mass of consumers
who demand yt units of the product in period t (t = 1; 2). We normalize y1  1 and y2  y to reduce
notation, and assume a growing economy, where y > 1, for reasons that will become clear later in the
paper. We denote by uj(i) the willingness to pay of the consumers in segment i for a unit of a product
of quality j 2 fh; lg with uh(i) > ul(i). Segments di¤er in consumerswillingness to pay and are indexed
such that uj(i) decreases in i. Let  be the time discount factor.
In each period, M can enter a segment through either direct investment (k) or licensing (s). The
two entry modes di¤er in both the quality provided and cost structure. Direct investment delivers Ms
true quality, whereas licensing always delivers low quality because of local licenseeslimited technological
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capacity. Direct investment requires, in each period, a country-wide setup cost f and a marginal cost ck,
which is assumed to be type-independent.3 Licensing requires a smaller setup cost, which is normalized to
zero, but a larger marginal cost becauseM has to use extra resources to manage its licensee, an independent
entity. Let cj be M js marginal cost of licensing for j 2 fh; lg. We assume the high types licensing cost to
be greater than the low types (ch > cl > ck) for the following reason. To prevent its licensee from stealing
its technology, M has to mask it during licensing. With better technology, Mh stands to lose more from
leaking its know-how than M l does, and hence is willing to incur a greater cost in masking.4
There are numerous identical domestic rms in each segment. A domestic rm can imitateMs technol-
ogy at cost c and deliver a low quality product. We assume that such imitation is possible even in segments
the multinational has chosen not to enter. To ensure that we do not trivialize the welfare implications of
our analysis, we assume that although both modes o¤er a low-quality product, imitation is (weakly) less
e¢ cient than licensing: c  ch. The strength of IPR enforcement is represented by , the probability that
an imitator will be prosecuted at the end of each period. Once caught out, the imitator must compensate
M with its sales revenue.5 In our main analysis we assume that the strength of IPR enforcement remains
the same over the two periods, an assumption that will be relaxed later.
The timing of the game and the information structure are as follows. In the rst period, the multi-
national chooses whether to enter each segment, and, if it does so, whether to enter through licensing
or investment. If it chooses licensing, it makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to a randomly chosen domestic
rm (M has all of the bargaining power because of the large number of identical domestic rms). If the
o¤er is accepted, the licensee is entitled to use Ms technology at a fee to supply the product in that
particular segment. If the o¤er is rejected, M does not enter that segment. In each segment, including
those that the multinational has chosen not to enter, domestic rms can always engage in imitation. All
imitators and the multinationals legal operation, if any, compete à la Bertrand in each segment. In the
second period, M must make a new decision regarding investment or licensing. The two periods di¤er in
market size, as captured by y, and in consumersbelief concerning the multinationals type. We assume
that consumers can distinguish between imitators and the multinational. However, they cannot directly
observe product quality or Ms type.6 At the beginning of the rst period, consumersa priori belief is
that M = Mh with probability 1. By the end of that period, consumers observe both Ms entry mode
(licensing or investment) in their own segment and its entry scale (i.e., the number of segments entered by
M) through each mode in the entire country.7 This information allows consumers to update their beliefs
at the beginning of the second period, 2. Finally, we assume that imitators have the same information
3As explained later (footnote 9), our analysis remains qualitatively the same even when ck is type-dependent.
4This idea is formalized in our working paper (Che et al., 2012).
5We assume that IPR are enforced even in the segments the multinational has not entered. Note that a convicted o¤ender
may not always make the required compensation payment in a country with weak IPR enforcement. In this regard,  should
be interpreted as the probability that a local copycat is caught and actually pays the compensation.
6This assumption can be relaxed to allow consumers to have a chance to observe product quality at the end of the rst
period, but the results remain qualitatively unchanged (Che et al., 2012).
7Consumers can observe the entry mode and scale because the legal operations of a multinational constitute public
information.
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structure as consumers.
3 The Signaling Equilibrium
3.1 Multinationals payo¤
In period t and segment i, if an imitator is able to sell its product at price p, its expected payo¤ is (1 )p c.
Competition among imitators drives the price to
p  c
1   :
Knowing that imitators can produce only a low-quality product, consumers in segment i will buy from an
imitator only if ul(i)  p. Therefore, imitation is feasible only in segments i  x, where x is determined by
ul(x)  p:
x is the index of the marginal segment in which domestic rms are indi¤erent between imitating and not
imitating. Slightly abusing the notation, we also use x to denote the scale of potential imitation. Note
that x decreases in : strengthening IPR enforcement reduces the potential scale of imitation.
If M enters segment i  x with an investment (after having sunk setup cost f), it faces competition
from imitators. Consumers in segment i are willing to pay up to
ut(i) = tu
h(i) + (1  t)ul(i)
for Ms product supplied through investment when their belief is t. As M enjoys both a cost advantage
(ck < c) and quality premium (ut(i)  ul(i)), it can charge a price that is su¢ ciently low to fend o¤
imitators in the Bertrand competition. This means that M will set its price p such that ut(i)   pk =
ul(i)  p, or pk = ut(i)  ul(i) + p, and its investment prot in segment i  x will thus be
yt[u
t(i)  ul(i) + p  ck]:
If M enters segment i  x through licensing, its licensee will have to charge p to ght o¤ competition
from imitators. The licensee thus will earn ytp from licensing. If the licensee does not accept the license
o¤er, it has the option to become an imitator and earn zero payo¤. Thus, M will set the licensing fee at
ytp and o¤er the license to a random domestic rm, which will accept the o¤er. Accordingly, Ms licensing
prot in segment i  x will be
yt(p  cj):
ShouldM decide to withhold from entering a segment i  x, imitation will take place, andMs expected
payo¤ will be ytp.
In segment i > x, there is no competition from imitators. Thus, the price in segment i is ut(i) for
investment and ul(i) for licensing, and Ms prot is
yt(u
t(i)  ck)
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under direct investment and
yt(u
l(i)  cj)
under licensing. If M withholds in segment i, it receives nothing from this segment.
The following table summarizes M js payo¤ per unit of market size in segment i and period t. The
multinationals total prot (excluding xed cost f in the case of investment) is this per-unit payo¤multiplied
by market size yt. As previously noted, the two periods di¤er in yt and possibly t.
Table 1: M js payo¤ per unit of market size in segment i and period t
segment
i  x i > x
investment (k) ut(i)  ul(i) + c1    ck ut(i)  ck
licensing (s) c1    cj ul(i)  cj
withholding/imitation (x) c1  0
3.2 Entry decision
Denote by fjt ; jtg the entry choice made by M j in period t, where jt is the measure of segments entered
through direct investment and jt is the measure entered through licensing. Denote by 
j
t M
js total
prot in period t. The entry problem faced by the multinational di¤ers between the two periods, as the
rst-period entry serves the additional function of signaling.
 The second period
In the second period, the trade-o¤ between direct investment and licensing is the following. Direct
investment requires a setup cost, f . However, in every segment, investment dominates licensing, as ck <
cl < ch and u2(i)  ul(i) for all i. Therefore, investment and licensing cannot coexist.
Suppose that M j chooses licensing. Because the licensing payo¤ decreases in i, licensing yields a
non-negative prot in segment i  sj , where sj is dened by
ul(sj)  cj : (1)
As cj < c1  , we have s
j > x. Note that sj depends on Ms type owing to the di¤erence in licensing cost,
and sj is the same for both periods. Dene
js 
Z x
0

c
1     c
j

di+
Z sj
x
(ul(i)  cj)di (2)
as M js payo¤ per unit of market size under licensing. Then M js second-period prot is j2;s = y
j
s.
Suppose that M j chooses investment. Similar to the foregoing analysis, direct investment generates a
non-negative prot in segment i  k2 , where k2 is dened by
u2(k2)  ck: (3)
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Because ck < c1  and u
2(i)  ul(i), we have k2 > x. Note that k2 depends on 2 but not on j (i.e., the
true identity of M for a given 2). Dene

2
k 
Z x
0

u2(i)  ul(i) + c
1     ck

di+
Z k2
x
(u2(i)  ck)di (4)
as Ms payo¤ per unit of market size under investment. Then Ms second-period prot is 22;k = y
2
k   f .
The second-period entry problem for M j is therefore reduced to a choice between direct investment
and licensing: maxf22;k;j2;sg.
 The rst period
The rst-period entry prole f1; 1g a¤ects consumers beliefs in the second period. Their o¤-
equilibrium beliefs are assumed to follow the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). M js rst-period
choice is therefore
max
fj1;j1g
j1(fj1; j1g) + maxf2(f1;1g)2;k ;j2;sg: (5)
For signaling purposes,M j may choose investment and licensing simultaneously in the rst period, in which
case we assume for the sake of simplicity that its investments are in lower-indexed segments: investment in
segments i 2 [0; j1] and licensing in segments i 2 (j1; j1 + j1].8 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a pair
of ffh1 ; h1g; fl1; l1gg that solves (5) for j 2 fh; lg simultaneously.
3.3 Equilibrium under symmetric information
As a benchmark, we rst consider the case of symmetric information, i.e., Ms type is known to consumers.
As consumerswillingness to pay and entry cost do not change over time, the entry scale of any given entry
mode must be the same across the two periods: j1 = 
j
2 = k
j and j1 = 
j
2 = s
j , where kj is dened by
uj(kj)  ck: (6)
As before, because ck < c1  and u
j(i)  ul(i), we have kj > x.
Because the second-period prot is independent of fj1; j1g, Ms rst-period entry simply maximizes
the prot in that period. As in the second period, investment and licensing do not coexist in period 1
and, hence, the entry problem in this period is again reduced to a choice between direct investment and
licensing. The equilibrium entry mode, however, may di¤er between the two periods, as the market size
grows. Dene jk as M
js investment payo¤ per unit of market size under symmetric information:
jk 
Z x
0

uj(i)  ul(i) + c
1     ck

di+
Z kj
x
(uj(i)  ck)di: (7)
8This assumption helps to simplify the exposition of our analysis. Otherwise, Ms entry may consist of greater dimensions
(moving down the segments, the entry may be investment, licensing, then investment again and licensing again, etc.), which
would greatly expandMs strategy space and complicate our analysis without yielding any new insights. Note that the assumed
behavior would be optimal if uh(i) declines with i faster than ul(i). To see why, suppose thatM invests in segment i but licenses
in segment i0 < i. LetM swap the mode of entry between the two segments. As the entry scale of each mode remains the same,
the swap does not a¤ect consumersposterior belief, 2, and henceMs second period prot. Nevertheless, its rst-period prot
changes by the amount of [1u
h(i0)+(1 1)ul(i0)+ul(i)] [1uh(i)+(1 1)ul(i)+ul(i0)] = 1[uh(i0) uh(i)] 1[ul(i0) ul(i)],
which is positive given the assumption that uh(i) declines with i faster than ul(i). Thus, M is better o¤ with the swap.
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In the rst period, the prot is jk f for direct investment and js for licensing. The corresponding prots
in the second period are yjk   f and yjs respectively.
Lemma 1 Suppose that
hk < f < y(
h
k   hs ): (8)
Under symmetric information, both types of M license in the rst period. In the second period, Mh chooses
direct investment, whereas M l chooses direct investment if f  y(lk   ls) and licensing otherwise.
Condition (8) characterizes a growing economy, the size of which is too small in the rst period for
investment to be protable even for Mh, but becomes much larger in the second period, such that Mh
nds investment more protable than licensing. To simplify the exposition and focus on our scenario of
interest, we assume throughout the remainder of the paper that condition (8) holds. Because lk < 
h
k , if
investment is unprotable forMh in the rst period, it must also be unprotable forM l. Note that because
M always operates beyond the marginal segment in which imitators are indi¤erent between entering and
not entering, imitation does not take place in equilibrium.
We now consider the e¤ects of strengthening IPR enforcement under symmetric information. For a given
entry mode, Ms entry scale is determined by its zero-prot condition and is independent of . In every
segment that M enters, the social benet and social cost of supplying Ms product are also independent of
. The presence of imitators merely reduces the rent that M enjoys. As the reduction in Ms rent (which
equals ul(i)  c1  ) is the same whether it enters through investment or licensing, jk js is independent of
 for either type of multinational. Therefore, IPR strength does not a¤ect the equilibrium choice of entry
mode. In sum, stronger IPR enforcement does not change social welfare.
Ms prots, however, are improved by stronger IPR enforcement:
djk
d
=
djs
d
=
Z x
0
c
(1  )2 di+ (p()  u
l(x))
dx
d
=
Z x
0
c
(1  )2 di;
which is positive when x > 0. Stronger IPR enforcement has two e¤ects. First, it raises imitators
break-even price p(), which allows M j to charge consumers a higher price. Second, it reduces the scale
of potential imitation (x). The second e¤ect is muted, however, because in the marginal segment in
which imitators are indi¤erent between entering and not entering, their break-even price equals consumers
willingness to pay, p() = ul(x), and thus M j loses no prots because of the threat of imitation.
Proposition 1 Under symmetric information, IPR violations never take place in equilibrium. Stronger
IPR enforcement does not a¤ect social surplus or entry choice, but (weakly) improves the multinationals
prots.
The last property, i.e., that the multinationals prots increase with IPR strength, justies the con-
ventional wisdom in an environment in which information is symmetric. It is worth emphasizing that no
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matter how weak the IPR enforcement is, imitation will never take place in equilibrium in such an envi-
ronment. With a cost advantage and quality premium (when Mh enters through direct investment), M is
able to outprice imitators through competition. The absence of equilibrium imitation arises not from the
nature of Bertrand competition, but rather from the numerous copycats competing with one another. Our
result holds even under Cournot competition. The consequences of weak IPR enforcement lie not in any
observed IPR violations but in Ms lower prots resulting from the threat of potential imitation.
3.4 Equilibrium under asymmetric information
We now turn to the main focus of this paper: reputation concerns arising from information asymmetry. A
better reputation enables a multinational to charge a higher price when it enters through direct investment
in the second period. As a result, both multinational types may try to establish a better reputation by
carefully choosing their rst-period entry prole. In particular, M l may attempt to mimic Mhs entry
choice, and in response Mh may adopt an entry prole that distances it from M l.
M l will be discouraged from mimicking Mhs entry prole if being itself produces a better payo¤:
ls + maxfylk   f; ylsg  l1(fh1 ; h1g) + (yhk   f): (9)
Note that the second term on the right-hand side, (yhk   f), is the low types second-period payo¤
when it successfully convinces consumers that it is a high type. The following condition, which we assume
throughout the rest of the paper, ensures that it is feasible for Mh to distance itself from M l:
ls   xp  y(hk   lk); (10)
where xp =
R x
0
pdi is the multinationals payo¤ should it withdraw completely. The right-hand side
of (10) is the upper bound of the return that M l obtains by successfully convincing consumers that it
is Mh. The left-hand side is the maximal cost that Mh can impose on M l by choosing to withhold its
entry completely in the rst period. When (10) holds, it is feasible for Mh to choose an entry prole (by
withholding from enough segments) in period 1 that M l will nd unprotable to mimic.
Given such feasibility, we now turn to Mhs incentive to separate itself from M l. With a particular
entry prole f1; 1g and posterior belief 2, M js two-period total prot is
j(f1; 1g; 2)  j1(f1; 1g) + maxfy2k   f; yjsg:
The marginal return to a better reputation is @
j
@2
. When 2 is su¢ ciently large, both types undertake
direct investment in the second period, in which case they enjoy the same marginal return:
@h
@2
=
@l
@2
= y
@
2
k
@2
:
Because direct investment in the rst period gives the two types the same payo¤, the marginal cost of
reputation through period-1 investment is the same for both:
@h
@1
=
@l
@1
:
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The marginal cost of reputation through licensing di¤ers, however:
@j
@1
=
8<:
c  cj > 0; if 1  x;
ul(1)  cj  0; if 1 2 (x; sj ];
ul(1)  cj < 0; if 1 > sj :
In particular, ch > cl implies that
@h
@1
<
@l
@1
; 81:
Mh is able to command an advantage over M l in paying for a better reputation in two situations. The
rst is when 1 2 (sh; sl), in which case a marginal reduction in licensing scale benets Mh but hurts M l.
The second is when 1  sh, in which case a marginal reduction in licensing scale costs Mh less than it
costs M l.
The foregoing discussion establishes the single-crossing property: there exists 1  sl, such that main-
taining a better reputation through a reduction in licensing scale is less costly forMh than forM l. Given the
feasibility condition (10), there therefore exists s > 0, such that (9) holds in equality at fh1 ; h1g = f0; sg:
ls  l1(f0; sg)  ; (11)
where
  (yhk   f)  maxfylk   f; ylsg (12)
is the return to M l from mimicking Mh. In (11) and (12), ls is given by (2), 
j
k is given by (7), and
l1(f0; sg) =
8><>:
R x
0
(p()  cl)di+ R s
x
(ul(i)  cl)di for s > x;R s
0
(p()  cl)di+ R x
s p()di for s
  x:
We are now ready to present one of the key results of this paper.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique and separating equilibrium, where, in the rst period, M l licenses
in sl segments, and Mh licenses in minfs; shg segments.
The formal proof of Proposition 2 is relegated to the Appendix, but its intuition can be simply explained.
Because Mh and M l di¤er only in their licensing costs, Mh is unable to distance itself from M l via direct
investment alone. Because investment is unprotable in the rst period, any combination of investment
and licensing is dominated by a combination of withholding and licensing. No pooling equilibrium exists
because by choosing a licensing scale below sl, Mh commands an advantage over M l in paying for a better
reputation. In a separating equilibrium, knowing that its type will be fully revealed in the second period,
M l enters fully (i.e., sl segments) in period 1, as it does in the benchmark case. To separate itself from
M l, Mh chooses s when s < sh. If s  sh, Mh will simply choose f0; shg to maximize its rst-period
prot, as M l will make no attempt to mimic Mhs entry prole.9
From Proposition 2, it is straightforward to derive the following result.
9For simplicity we assume that ck does not depend on Ms type, although the results remain the same even if it does. In
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Proposition 3 IPR violation takes place in equilibrium if and only if M = Mh and s < x, and it takes
place in period 1 in segments i 2 [s; x].
Recall that imitation is never observed when information is symmetric. Proposition 3 highlights the
reason for equilibrium imitation: the strategic withholding of entry by the multinational in an attempt
to maintain its reputation, which in turn allows imitators to survive in the market. A unique feature of
this paper is that IPR violations take place in equilibrium despite the possibility of licensing. The existing
literature generates equilibrium imitation by assuming away the possibility of licensing, which we consider
unrealistic. By introducing reputation concerns, we are able to show how IPR violations may emerge in
equilibrium in an environment that allows the multinational to license to potential imitators.
For the remainder of the paper, we refer to the case of s > x as a non-imitation equilibrium and to
that of s  x as an imitation equilibrium. We rst identify the factors that a¤ect the extent of IPR
violations. Suppose that uj(i) can be shifted up by parameter j for j 2 fh; lg for all i and that  = 11+r
is the discount factor corresponding to an interest rate r. Condition (11) reveals the following.
Proposition 4 In an imitation equilibrium, the scale of IPR violations increases in y and h and decreases
in r and l.
Proposition 4 suggests that more IPR violations will be observed in an economy with a higher growth
rate, lower interest rate, or larger quality premium (higher h or lower l). A rapidly growing economy
that expands the product market substantially in the future increases the return to a good reputation,
thus enhancing the incentive for M l to mimic Mh unless Mh withdraws its entry further to increase the
cost of mimicking. As Mh withdraws further, it leaves more room for IPR violations. Likewise, a lower
interest rate in a growing economy increases the present discounted value of a good reputation, forcing
Mh to further withdraw its entry to prevent M l from mimicking it. A quality premium does not increase
IPR violations because imitated products can be priced at a higher amount. In our model, imitators are
assumed to be competitive, and as a result they price at their marginal cost (adjusted by the probability of
IPR enforcement) without any direct e¤ect of a higher quality premium. Instead, a larger quality premium
enhances the return to a good reputation, which, as in the case of a higher growth rate or lower interest
rate, induces Mh to further withdraw its entry, leaving more room for imitation.
equilibrium M enters in the rst period through licensing such that the investment cost ck does not matter. In the second
period, Ms type is fully revealed through signaling, and thus ck a¤ects only Ms payo¤ without qualitatively changing any
results reported in the propositions. If ck depends on Ms type, M may signal its type in the rst period through investment
rather than withholding licensing scale. However, as noted, withholding in a given segment (which gives M a positive payo¤)
always dominates investment in that segment (which gives M a negative payo¤ because of the limited market size in period
1). Finally, in the incentive-compatibility condition (equations (11) and (12)), the expression of  will change if ck is type-
dependent, but  will continue to be independent of enforcement strength , and thus all of the comparative static results
remain unchanged.
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4 The E¤ects of Strengthening IPR Enforcement
Having established the equilibrium under asymmetric information, we now examine the e¤ects of strength-
ening IPR enforcement (i.e., a larger ) on Ms entry scale and prots and social welfare. We begin with
the following observations. First, because IPR enforcement does not alter consumers valuation of the
multinationals product, it exerts its inuence only through the operating decisions of the two types of M
and their imitators. Second, in a separating equilibrium, the types are fully revealed in the second period.
Thus, as discussed in the symmetric information case, the second-period entry decisions of both types ofM
are independent of . Third, the rst-period choice made by M l is also una¤ected. Only the rst-period
licensing scale of Mh is subject to change. Fourth, because x < minfsl; kh; klg and stronger enforcement
in the second period exerts an inuence only through x, the marginal gain of reputation, , is independent
of . This last observation implies that the change in Mhs rst-period licensing scale must come from the
marginal cost of reputation, i.e., the left-hand side of equation (11).
Consider rst a non-imitation equilibrium (s > x), in which case equation ( 11) becomesZ sl
s
(ul(i)  cl)di = :
Neither side of the equation involves , and thus equilibrium entry scale s does not depend on . Because
stronger enforcement makes it more costly for domestic rms to imitate Ms product, the imitatorsprice
(p) is higher and the imitation scale (x) is smaller. These two e¤ects a¤ectMh andM l symmetrically when
s is beyond x, and thus the incentive compatibility constraint remains intact. As x retreats, inequality
s > x continues to hold, so Mh and M l still operate beyond x. The retreat of x will therefore have no
e¤ect on Ms prot at the margin, but its prots inside the margin will increase owing to a higher p, as
in the case of symmetric information. Given that the entry scale of both types of M remains the same
in both periods and is larger than that of potential imitation, it is straightforward to conclude that social
welfare must also remain the same.
Proposition 5 In a non-imitation equilibrium, stronger IPR enforcement increases the prots of both Mh
and M l, but has no e¤ect on their entry decisions or social welfare.
Now consider an imitation equilibrium (s  x), in which case (11) becomesZ x
s()
(c  cl)di+
Z sl
x
(ul(i)  cl)di = : (13)
Because x is a function of , s must also depend on . Strengthening IPR enforcement has two asymmetric
e¤ects on Mh and M l, as the former operates inside the margin in which imitators operate (s < x),
whereas the latter operates beyond that margin (sl > x). The rising imitation price allows M l to raise its
payo¤ dollar by dollar in segment i 2 (s; x], but allows Mh to increase its payo¤ only through successful
litigation, i.e., only with probability . A smaller imitation scale does not a¤ectM ls payo¤, but it reduces
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Mhs, as Mh collects compensation from fewer segments in which imitation takes place. Hence stronger
IPR enforcement increases M ls prots more than Mhs (if Mhs prots increase at all). As a result, the
incentive compatibility constraint must become slack, allowingMh to expand s. Formally, we di¤erentiate
both sides of (13) with respect to  to get
(c  cl)ds

d
+ (ul(x)  c)dx
d
= 0: (14)
Because ul(x) = p > c and dxd < 0, we have
ds
d
> 0:
Proposition 6 (Entry Scale) In an imitation equilibrium, stronger IPR enforcement increases Mhs
rst-period entry scale, but has no e¤ect on M ls rst-period entry scale or either types second-period
entry decision.
We turn next to social welfare. An increase in s is accompanied by a decrease in x: some of the
segments previously served by imitators are now served by legally licensed products from Mh, whereas
others are no longer served at all. The rst change brings an e¢ ciency gain, as legal licensing is less costly
than imitation. The second change, however, results in an e¢ ciency loss. Imitation creates a social surplus
even though it violates Ms property rights. Under symmetric information, imitation does not take place
in equilibrium, and a decrease in x merely reduces the competition M faces without any e¤ect on social
welfare. Under asymmetric information, in contrast, Mh chooses not to serve certain segments. In an
imitation equilibrium, some of these unserved segments are served by imitators, which represents a social
gain. A smaller x reduces this social gain.
To determine the net e¤ect on social welfare, let Wh1 denote the rst-period social welfare for M
h:
Wh1 =
Z s()
0
(ul(i)  ch)di+
Z x()
s()
(ul(i)  c)di:
Making use of (14) we obtain
dWh1
d
= (c  ch)ds

d
+ (ul(x)  c)dx
d
(15)
= (cl   ch)ds

d
< 0:
Therefore, the e¢ ciency loss resulting from a smaller x always outweighs the e¢ ciency gain resulting from
a larger s, and thus rst-period social welfare decreases with  when M = Mh. Because IPR strength
does not a¤ect rst-period welfare when M = M l or second-period welfare for both types, we conclude
that the two-period total expected social welfare must decline.
Proposition 7 (Welfare) In an imitation equilibrium, strengthening IPR enforcement reduces social
welfare.
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It is well-known that, holding constant a multinationals incentive to innovate, stronger IPR protection
results in social welfare loss because it allows distortionary monopoly pricing. By assuming unit demand,
this paper stays away from such an e¤ect, and the welfare loss arises for an entirely di¤erent reason. From
(14) and (15), we know that e¢ ciency loss ul(i)   c equals the acquired incentive for M l to mimic Mh,
whereas e¢ ciency gain c   ch(i) is smaller than the acquired disincentive, c   cl(i), for M l not to mimic
Mh, as Mh faces a larger licensing cost. When IPR enforcement becomes stronger, s must respond to the
reduction in x to keep the acquired incentive in balance with the acquired disincentive. Therefore, social
welfare must decrease.
Finally, we analyze how better IPR enforcement inuences a multinationals prots and hence its
incentive to innovate. When s  x, M ls operating scale exceeds that of imitators in both periods, and
thus stronger IPR enforcement raisesM ls prots, as in the benchmark case. Similarly,Mhs second-period
prots also increase: d(y
h
k f)
d = y
R x
0
c
(1 )2 di > 0. M
hs rst-period prot is
h1 (f0; sg) =
Z s()
0
 
p()  ch di+ Z x()
s()
p()di:
Di¤erentiating this prot with respect to , we obtain
dh1 (f0; sg)
d
= (c  ch)ds

d
+
Z x
0
c
(1  )2 di+ p
dx
d
:
This expression reveals three e¤ects that stronger IPR enforcement has on Mhs rst-period prot. First,
it expands s, which allows Mh to drive away imitators in some segments and collect social gain c   ch
in each of these segments. Second, it raises the imitation price, and thus Mhs payo¤, as Mh will raise
its own price in licensed segments and collect more compensation in segments in which imitation takes
place. Third, it reduces x, which reduces the compensation that Mh can collect through IPR litigation.
Substituting (14) into the foregoing equation allows us to calculate the e¤ect of stronger enforcement on
Mhs total prots:
d(h1 (f0; sg) + (yhk   f))
d
= xp

1 + y
1   +
ch   cl
c  cl
d lnx
d ln 

:
Proposition 8 (Prot) In an imitation equilibrium, stronger IPR enforcement increases the prots of
M l. It increases the prots of Mh if and only if
(1 + y)
c  cl
ch   cl + (1  )
d lnx
d ln 
> 0: (16)
To better understand condition (16), note that
(1  )d lnx
d ln 
=

1  
c
xul0(x)
;
where ul
0
(i)  dul(i)di . Therefore, we can further conclude the following.
Corollary In any imitation equilibrium, stronger IPR enforcement
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Figure 1: First-period entry scale, two-period prots, and social welfare when M =Mh and ul(i) = bi .
1) increases the prot of Mh when  is su¢ ciently small, but
2) decreases the prot of Mh for some positive  when ul
0
() is su¢ ciently small.
To illustrate this corollary, we consider utility function ul(i) = bi , where b is some positive constant
and  > 0 measures the dispersion in willingness to pay across segments. A larger  corresponds to a
more dispersed distribution. Should the willingness to pay be rooted in a¤ordability,  also reects income
dispersion. Given that ul(x) = p, we have (1  )d ln xd ln  =    . Hence, condition (16) is reduced to
(1 + y)
c  cl
ch   cl >


;
which holds when  is small, and does not hold when  is su¢ ciently small.
Figure 1 shows how, for ul(i) = bi , Mhs rst-period entry scale, two-period total prots and social
welfare respond to changes in . Condition (14) reveals that imitation arises in equilibrium (s  x) if and
only if  is below some threshold, say, . In such an equilibrium, x declines with , whereas s increases
with it. Social welfare decreases with , and Mhs prot is inversely U-shaped. When   , imitation
does not take place in equilibrium (s  x). In this region, x continues to decline as  increases, but
the prots earned by Mh begin to increase with . At the same time, s becomes independent of  and,
as a result, social welfare remains constant. When enforcement becomes su¢ ciently strong, imitation is
no longer feasible in any segment. A further strengthening of IPR enforcement has no e¤ect whatsoever.
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Because M faces no threats from local competition, its prot equals the social surplus.
The comparative statics discussed thus far (Propositions 5 through 8) o¤er a few interesting insights.
First, they put into perspective the empirical observations that stronger IPR enforcement encourages
multinationals entry (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Smith, 2001; Branstetter et al., 2006; Ivus, 2010;
Branstetter et al., 2011). Our analysis demonstrates that stronger IPR enforcement encourages the entry
of multinationals only when IPR violations are observed in equilibrium.
Second, whenever such entry is expanded by stronger IPR enforcement, social welfare declines. Stronger
enforcement exerts two e¤ects on social welfare. By inducing more entry, it allows certain segments to be
served more e¢ ciently (through licensing rather than imitation). However, it also forces imitators to
abandon certain segments. As explained earlier, the very reason that a multinational is induced to leave
some segments unserved implies that the gain will be outweighed by the loss. This cautions welfare
implications based on the aforementioned empirical observations.
Third, our analysis o¤ers an alternative explanation for why stronger IPR enforcement may lead to
e¢ ciency loss ex post, that is, after a technology has been invented. It is well understood that IPR
protection involves a social cost and that this cost arises because IPR protection allows the innovator
to charge distortionary monopoly prices. This conventional channel of e¢ ciency loss is removed from
the present paper as we assume a perfectly inelastic demand. In this paper, the e¢ ciency loss arises
because stronger IPR enforcement reduces the total number of segments served (particularly those served
by imitators). More fundamentally, the ex post e¢ ciency loss stems from non-rivalry over knowledge: Once
a knowledge has been invented, allowing it to be used by copycats in markets not served by its owner will
create social gains, and forbidding such imitation constitutes a social loss. In the presence of reputation
concerns, weak enforcement allows imitators to exploit such non-rivalry over knowledge; strong enforcement
denies such a possibility.
Fourth, strengthened IPR enforcement does not always improve multinationalsex ante incentives to
innovate. As a multinational derives ex ante incentives from the prots it can earn ex post, Propositions
5 and 8 imply that better enforcement can have divergent e¤ects on innovation for di¤erent types of
multinational. Stronger enforcement always encourages the innovation of low-quality products, but it may
discourage the innovation of high-quality products when the enforcement has reached a certain level. In
this regard, the average quality of the technology transferred to a developing country may be lower, thus
representing an ex ante e¢ ciency loss from IPR improvement.
Although the foregoing discussion appears to portray rather grim prospects for IPR improvement in the
presence of information asymmetry, there is a situation in which stronger IPR enforcement unambiguously
enhances Ms prots regardless of its type. We have thus far assumed the strength of IPR enforcement
to be identical across the two periods. Suppose that we relax this assumption to allow di¤erent IPR
enforcement strengths in the two periods. More specically, let t be the strength of IPR enforcement
in period t = 1; 2, with 2  1, meaning that any improvement in the rst period is also e¤ective in
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the second. Per condition (11), it is easy to verify that 2 has no e¤ect on the rst-period behavior of
M or its copycats, and hence is inconsequential to social welfare or Ms prot in period 1. Therefore,
regardless of the value of 2, the e¤ects of 1 on rst-period social welfare and M
hs prot remain the
same as described in Propositions 7 and 8. Furthermore, because Ms type is fully revealed in the second
period in a separating equilibrium, we can apply the same logic as in Proposition 1 to conclude that the
only e¤ect of an increased 2 is an increase in Ms second-period prot.
Proposition 9 In an imitation equilibrium, deferred improvement in IPR enforcement (i.e., increasing
2 without changing 1) strictly improves the prots of both types of multinationals without a¤ecting the
two-period total social surplus.
As in Proposition 7, the social surplus result in Proposition 9 ignores the inuences of improved prof-
itability on innovation incentives. Should this e¤ect be taken into account, deferred improvement in IPR
enforcement can strictly improve social welfare. Together with Propositions 7 and 8, Proposition 9 o¤ers
a possible rationale for deferred IPR improvement in developing countries in which reputation concerns
inhibit multinational entry. Because stronger IPR enforcement is most e¤ective in the absence of friction,
delaying IPR improvement until after multinationalsstrategic entry has helped to overcome information
asymmetry can bring unequivocal social gains.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we demonstrate that because developing countries su¤er from many forms of imperfection,
multinationals may withhold entry for reasons other than weak IPR enforcement. Such withholding allows
copycats to operate, giving rise to IPR violations in equilibrium, a point that is largely ignored in the
literature. We show that imitation in the shadow of IPR enforcement can be an alternative channel for
technology transfer and that strengthening such enforcement may not be in the best interests of either the
host country or multinationals.
In addition to imperfect IPR protection, the particular form of imperfection that we focus on herein
is the information asymmetry between foreign multinationals and local consumers concerning the quality
of the formers product. In the introduction, we stress the pertinence of this form of imperfection in
developing countries. It also allows us to explain why the Pareto gains achieved under moderately weak
enforcement cannot be attained under perfect enforcement through a contractual arrangement. It would be
useful to investigate the other forms of imperfection that may prevent foreign multinationals from entering
a developing country even under perfect enforcement.
6 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
We rst consider the iso-prot curves. We plot the iso-prot curves of j(f1; 1g; 2) while xing 1 = 0
in Figure 2, where the solid curve corresponds to M l and the dotted curve corresponds to Mh. When
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Figure 2: Iso-prot curves when 1 = 0.
2 < 
l, the iso-curve of M l is at because M l chooses licensing in the second period, and consumers
belief thus becomes immaterial. The case is similar for Mh when 2 < 
h. When 2 < 
j , the iso-prot
curve is highest when j = sj because, with 2 xed, the entry prole that maximizes 
j is (0; sj) for
j 2 fh; lg. Note that h > l and sh < sl.
When 2 > 
j , M j adopts direct investment in the second period. Fixing 2, the entry prole that
maximizes j is (0; sj) for j 2 fh; lg, and thus all iso-curves of M j are tangent to 2 at sj . As the small
arrows indicate, with 1 xed, an iso-curve to the right corresponds to a larger j(f0; 1g; 2), as a higher
2 increases 
j .
The iso-prot curves in Figure 2 satisfy the single-crossing property in the shaded area: Mh has an
advantage over M l in paying for a better reputation provided that 1 < sl. The entry prole f0; sg falls
within the shaded area when 2 = 1, indicating that it is also feasible for M
h to credibly distance itself
from M l. We now prove the proposition formally in three steps.
Step 1. There exists no pooling equilibrium. Suppose that a pooling equilibrium does exist, where both
types choose f1; 1g in the rst period. Then, 2 = 1. M l is willing to choose the equilibrium entry
prole only if doing so dominates being itself, that is:
l1(f1; 1g) + maxfy1k   f; ylsg  ls + maxfylk   f; ylsg:
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Given the denition of s, the foregoing becomes
l1(f1; 1g) + maxfy1k   f; ylsg  l1(f0; sg) + maxfyhk   f; ylsg:
Then, there exists an s0 > 0 such that
l1(f0; s0g) + maxfyhk   f; ylsg = l1(f1; 1g) + maxfy1k   f; ylsg:
The last two observations combined yield
l1(f0; s0g)  l1(f0; sg):
Because l1(f0; 1g) is concave (and hence quasi-concave) in 1 and maximized at 1 = sl, s0 takes
two values, one of which falls between s and sl. This s0 lies in the region in which the iso-prot curves
of Mh and M l satisfy the single-crossing property, meaning that Mh has an advantage over M l in paying
for a better reputation. In other words, there exists an  > 0 such that M l is not interested in choosing
f0; s0   g regardless of how consumers respond in shaping their subsequent belief:
l1(f0; s0   g) + maxfyhk   f; ylsg < l1(f1; 1g) + maxfy1k   f; ylsg:
Mh, in contrast, will nd such deviation protable if consumers assign a su¢ ciently high 2 after observing
it. Hence, the pooling equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion test.
Step 2. In a separating equilibrium, Mh chooses no direct investment in the rst period (i.e., h1 = 0).
Suppose that Mh does choose some fh1 ; h1g in such an equilibrium. Without loss of generality, consider
s0 2 (0; sl) such that10
l1(f0; s0g) = l1(fh1 ; h1g): (17)
Because direct investment in any segment in the rst period is unprotable, it must be true that
s0 < h1 : (18)
Now consider a deviation by Mh from fh1 ; h1g to f0; s0g in the rst period. As s0 satises (17), M l has
no incentive to deviate whatever belief consumers would assign following the deviation. However, Mh can
prot from such deviation provided that consumers respond with a large subsequent belief, 2. To see this,
note that
l1(f0; s0g) h1 (f0; s0g) = s0(ch   cl);
whereas
l1(fh1 ; h1g) h1 (fh1 ; h1g) = h1 (ch   cl):
Following (18) and holding ch > cl, we have
l1(f0; s0g) h1 (f0; s0g) < l1(fh1 ; h1g) h1 (fh1 ; h1g);
10 If there does not exist an s0 > 0 such that equation (17) holds, then it is evident that Mh can protably deviate from
fh1 ; h1g to f0; sg while keeping its distance from M l. Given that s0 > 0 solves equation (17), as argued in step 1, s0 can
take two solutions, with one falling below sl.
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which in turn implies (given (17))
h1 (f0; s0g) > h1 (fh1 ; h1g); (19)
meaning that Mh can prot from a deviation to f0; s0g.
Step 3. In a separating equilibrium, M l licenses in sl segments in the rst period, and Mh licenses in
minfs; shg segments. In such an equilibrium, as its type will be fully revealed in the second period, M l
chooses sl as in the benchmark case. Given M ls choice, Mh maximizes its own payo¤ without inducing
any mimicking from M l by choosing h1 = s
 if s < sh, and h1 = s
h if sh  s. Q.E.D.
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